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TOUCHE, ROSS & CO. , 
ET AL. 
' 
Cert to CA 2 




Petr sued the First National Bank of Boston, alleging that the Bank with 
other defendants had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. § 78a 
et seq., state law, and common law. The DC (S.D. N.Y., MacMahon) granted the 
Bank's motion to dismiss, holding that it had not waived its right to be sued only 
in D. Mass. under the venue provisions of the National Ba nk Act, 12 U.S. C. § 94. 
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CA 2 affirmed without opinion. Petr argues that the more liberal provisions of the 
Securitie s Exchange Act should govern. 
1. FACTS: The National Bank Act's venue provisions permit a national 
bank to b e sued on ly in the territorial jurisdictions (federal, state, or municipal) 
in which the bank is J.ocated. 12 U.S. C. § 94. The Securitie s Exchange Act lays the 
venue of suits brought under it 11 in the district wherein any act or transaction con-
stituting the dolation occurred, ... or in the district wherein the defendant is 
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business •... 11 15 U.S. C. § 78aa. On at 
least two occasions prior to the commenceme.nt of this suit, CA 2 held that the venue 
provisions of the National Bank Act govern in a suit against a bank under the 
,., ...... 
Securities Exchange A ct. Klein v. Bower, 42·1 F. 2d 338 (2 Cir. 1970); Bruns, 
Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F. 2d 300 (2 ·cir. ), 
cert denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968). 
Petr brought suit inS. D. N.Y. and opposed a motion to dismiss the Bank by 
arguing that the Bank had waived its right to restrictive venue in a document 
designating the I\'e\\' York Superintendent of Banks as its agent for service of process, 
The DC found no \"-'aiver, and CA 2 agreed. 
\ 
In both co urts, petr argued directly only the waiver issue, which is not 
raised here. In its 1nemoranda below, petr did note the different venue provisions 
of the Secur ities Exchange Act, but recognized as settled law inCA 2 the proposition 
that the narrower provisions of the National Bank Act govern. On oral argument 
before CA 2, petr adverted to a CA 3 decision explicitly adopting the contrary 
position, Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aldicnp.csellschaft, 483 F. 2d 852 (3 Cir. 1973), 
but refus ed to suggest that CA 2 reverse its position; the case was cited for the 
proposition that \vaiver should be liberally found, 
\ 
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2. CONTENTIONS: Pctr argues that the circuits are split on the issue of 
just what venue provisions should govern suits ·against national banl<:s brought under 
the fedeyal securit~es laws. CA 3's position is correct for the reasons that court 
stated in rejecting CA 2's conclus ion: the purposes of the securities laws require 
that its broader venue provisions govern; the legislative history of the Act does not 
indicate any intent to exernpt banks from~ its venue provisions; the limited venue 
provisions of the National Bank Act have com~e under heavy scholarly fire. 
Resp argues that petr did not raise below the issue he seeks to present here, 
and explains the history of the case as sun1marized above. If the issue is properly 
before the Court, then-the case does not warrant review because (a) CA 2's position 
is correct, and (b) the record does not contain any re-examination by CA 2 of its 
position in light of Ronson, theCA 3 case. 
3, DISCUSSION: Resp cites three cases for the proposition that petr may 
not raise the issue he seeks to raise. Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317 
(1967); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S, 339 (1958); Busty v. United States, 382 'L. S. 
694 (1931). In each the Court refused to deal with an issue wholly unlike and 
unrelated to the matters raised on appeal. These cases arguably should not control 
here, where the existence of the legal issue was clear on the face of petr' s 
memoranda in the trial and appellate courts; petr simply chose not to ask CA 2 to 
reverse its settled position. Little would be added by requiring him to have done 
so in this case, since the issue-- which is exclusively an issue of law --is 
adequately framed by the differing views of the Courts of Appeals. 
The conflict among thP circuits is real. CA 3 specifically considered and 
rejected CA 2' s position. The conflict is not among a::> many circuits as petr 
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suggests, bowncr, wben he lines CA 9 up with CA 2. The Ninth Circuit did apply 
the Banldng Act v0nue provisions in a suit unde·r the securities laws, but it d;d so 
without dis c ussinr 1he issue petr seeks to present. United States National Bank v . 
Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (9 Cir. 1970). Several cases in this Court that resp ci1cs in 
~.;upport of its JJObHion are not dispositive, since they applied the Bank Act provisions 
in the face of diffe,rent, state venue provisions. See, ~·, Mercantile National Bank 
v . Langdeau , 371 U.S. 555 (1963). 
There i s a res pons e. 
J0/6/75 
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Mr. Justice Powell DATE: March 27, 1976 
Greg Palm 
No. 75-268 Radzanower v. First National 
Bank of Boston 
The issue in this case is whether § 94 of the National 
Bank Act (Bank Act) has been impliedly repealed by the venue 
provisions of § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934 
(Exchange Act). I recommend that the decision below, holding 
that there has been no such repeal, be affirmed. The issue 
is a close one, however, since from a "policy" viewpoi nt there 
is almost nothing to be said for the most restrictive venue 
provisions of the National Bank Act and since I think the 
Court would like to see the SEC "win" one for a change - although 
no matter which way the case goes the practical effects of the 
decision will not be great. 
I. Permissive/Prohibitive: 
Pet i tioners contend that § 94 is "permissive," while 
respondents contend that it is "prohibitive." Respondents 
are correct. The section is prohibitive in the sense that 
actionsagainst national banks must be brought in the district 
in which the bank is established, unless Congress provides 
otherwise in another statute. This follows from the Court's 
decisions in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 
555 (1963) and Michigan National Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 
2. 
591 (1963), where it was held that a State could not authorize 
suits against a national bank in courts other than those 
permitted by Congress. 
II. Repeal by Implication: 
On its face the venue provision of the Exchange Act 
permits national banks to be sued other than in the districts -
where they are established.* The question is therefore whether 
......___ . 
Congress intended to permit national banks charged with a 
violation of the Exchange Act to be sued in forums other than 
those provided for by the Bank Act. The Respondent's Brief 
does an excellent job of surmnarizing the "law" to be applied 
in answering this question: 
"In order to establish that section 27 of the 
Exchange Act impliedly repealed section 94, 
petitioner must demonstrate that: (i) the 
intention of Congress to repeal the earlier 
statute is clear and manifest and (ii) there 
is a positive repugnancy between the two statutes. 
Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion on 
each of these issues. Amell v. United States, 
384 U.S. 158, 165-166 (1968); Bu1ova Watch Co. 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); 
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 
353 u.s. 222, 228-229 (1957)." 
In the leading case of United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 
188, 198-199 (1939), the Court stated: 
"It is a cardinal principle of construction that 
repeals by implication are not favored. When 
there are two acts upon the same subject, the 
rule is to give effect to both if possible. 
[citations omitted]. The intention of the 
*See the attached copies of § 27 of the Exchange Act and § 94 
of the Bank Act. 
le islature to re eal 'must be clear and manifest' 
citations omitte . It is no·t . su icient . . . 
'to establish that subsequent laws cover some or 
even all of the cases provided for by [the prior 
act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or 
cumulative, or auxilliary'. There must be 'a 
positive reaugnancy between the provisions of the 
new law, an those of the old; and even then the 
old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto 
to the extent of the repugnancy.'" 
"With respect to the Exchange Act specifically 
'[r]epeal is to be regarded as implied only if 
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, 
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary. 
This is the guiding princi~le to reconciliation of 
the two statutory schemes. Silver v. New York Stock 
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)."(e~~acl.W) 
3. 
The evidence on this issue is paper thin. First, despite 
........ ... 
respondents' protestations to the contrary, it appears that 
Congress was aware that national banks might be involved in 
the kind of conduct prohibited by the Exchange Act. Thus 
Congress had before it a report of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency that discussed abuses on the part of 
investment and commercial banks in connection with securities 
transactions. S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Gong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
Respondents discount this report on the ground that it relates 
to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934. As petitioner points out, 
however, there is no question that the Exchange Act applies 
to national banks and that when Congress did not want a 
particular provision to apply, it specifically carved out an 
exception. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(i) (administrative and enforce-
ment of Exchange Act's registration and proxy provisions over 
the national banks issuance of securities vested in the 
4. 
Comptroller of the Currency). Second, the 
House bill had limited venue in actions brought to enforce 
the civil liabilities of the Exchange Act to the district 
where the defendant was an inhabitant or had its principal 
place of business, or in the district where the sale took place. 
The Senate version, which was eventually adopted, expanded 
the venue provisions to include any district where the defendant 
might be found or transacts business. These expansive provisions 
suggest that Congress was well aware of the "national" 
character of securities fraud and that broad venue pr ovisions 
were important to the enforcement of the Exchange Act. 
Congress did make certain provisions of the Exchange 
Act expressly not applicable to national banks. From this, 
petitioners argue that Congress was aware of the special 
position of national banks and that where no special provision 
was made for them, none was intended. I don't find that 
argument necessarily compelling. Congress was no doubt aware 
of the venue provisions of the Bank Act and gave no specific 
indication that it wished to repeal them in cases alleging 
securities fraud. Relying on the Canon that "repeals by 
implication are not favored" and the fact that (1) there is 
no evidence Congress intended any such repeal and (2) there 
is no "positive repugnancy" between the provisions of the 
two Acts (i.e., they can exist and have meaningful content 
side-by-side), I would think the correct conclusion is no 
repeal was accomplished by the Exchange Act. See pp. l·~ s~. 
5. 
~ sc<!:.. 
The most powerful argument against the conclusion that 
there was no implied repeal here rests on the idea that the 
venue provisions of the Exchange Act are "special", in contrast -----to the "general" venue provisions such as those established by 
28 U.S.C. § 1391.* The argument is that Congress made a very 
specific decision: in order to effectuate the purpose of the 
Exchange Act broad venue is necessary. Thus, although the 
Bank Act contains a specific venue provisions regarding actions 
against national banks, the Exchange Act contains an equally 
specific venue provision concerning securities fraud actions. 
If the Court opts for repeal by implication this is the line 
of argument that it must push. The chief difficulty that I 
have with it is that the Bank Act venue provision is clearly 
more "special" than the Exchange Act. There likely are venue 
provisions contained in all types of regulatory statutes 
proscribing various forms of behavior. But this does not 
mean that the earlier bank Act provision was impliedly repealed 
just because in some circumstances a national bank might be sued 
under the latter act. 
The policy considerations all favor the petitioner yet 
they are not that compelling and are relevant only insofar 
7 .. 
as the Court treats them as evidence of what Congress intended 
*28 U.S.C. § 139l(c) provides that "[a] corporation may be 
sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or 
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial 
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corpora-
tion for venue purposes." See Buffum v. Chase National Bank 
of the Citl of New York, 192 F.2d 58 (CA7) cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 944 ( 951)7 venue provisions of § 1391 did not repeal 
§ 94 of the BanK Act\. 
6. 
when it enacted the Exchange Act. The purpose of the National 
Bank Act's restrictive venue provision was to protect against 
the disruption of bank operations that would naturally follow 
from compelling the production of bank records to a distant 
forum in an age of slow transportation and backward copying 
technology. Yet Congress has not expressly repealed the Bank 
Act's venue provisions originally enacted in 1863. There is 
no doubt that a decision in favor of respondents would have 
some adverse effect on the enforcement of the Exchange Act. 
In cases where national banks are defendants, multiple suits 
may be required. This obviously results in a needless 
expenditure of judicial time and party resources. Moreover, 
~ 1. some private plaintiffs may be forced to forego actions against 
~ banks. There is also the possibility of conflicting adjudica-
tions based on the same securities transactions. Finally, as 
the SEC points out, if the district court in which venue lies 
under the Bank Act is over a hundred miles from the district 
in which witnesses are located, these witnesses could not be 
11 d d . 4 ( ) ~ ~ .... ~ ~ compe e to appear. Fe . R. C~v. P. 5 e . • 
It is not clear, however, how much weight these "policy" 
considerations in favor of repeal should be given. As I 
view the situation we are weighing a modest impai rment of the 
Exchange Act against the now negligible interests that are 
protected by § 94 of the Bank Act. Compare Gordon v. New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 
7. 
694 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 
(1963). Plaintiffs are not forced to abandon meritorious claims 
nor is there a conflict over the substantive provisions of 
the Exchange Act. They must simply bring their claims in a 
forum that will be more inconvenient in some circumstances. 
Also, the problem of unavailability of compulsory process 
against witnesses alluded to above may occur in some circum-
stances even under § 27 of the Exchange Act. There certainly 
is no "positive repugnancy" here that is impossible to 
reconcile without a repeal. 
III. Conclusions: 
In sum, this case is one of an intermitant series of 
unimportant Circuit Conflicts that may some day be passed 
off on a National Court of Appeals. Since we are stuck with 
it, however, I think that you should vote to affirm. This 
recommendation is very tentative, however, since my only 
"real" concern is that an opinion reversing may mess UJ? 
repeal-by-implication law in order to bring the case within 
the establishedflamew~rk (Cf. Colorado River cases). I do 
'" ::w:a _....,-....- .._. 
think that a narrow opinion could be written supporting reversal: 
it would emphasize (1) Congressional intent in establishing 
the broad venue provisions of the Exchange Act; (2) fact that 
the venue provision of the Exchange Act is "special, not 
8. 
"general"*; (3) it is impossible for us to believe that Congress 
would have wanted to exempt the national banks from the Exchange 
Act venue provision: (a) plain language, (b) fact that exempted 
banks in specified situations. This result is also appealing 
in that although I think that the Court has done an excellent 
job in the securities area this year, it would be nice if the 
SEC prevailed for once (although any victory here is minor)/'".,,_. 
G.P. 
ss 
*Some reliance could be placed on Stonite Products Co. v. 
Melvin Loyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (holding patent venue 
provisions not repealed by a subsequent statute with general 
venue provision), that the Exchange Act is "special" like the 
Patent Act. The argument obviously is weak. 
*.,.'"Attached is Judge Friendly 1 s opinion in Brums Nordeman .& Co. 
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.Zd 300 (CA2), 
cert denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968), which is the major Second 
C~rcu~t case supporting the conflict here. 
The venue provision of the National Bank Act (12 
U.S.C. §94) provides : 
"Actions and proceedings against any association 
under,this Chapter may be had in any district or _ 
territorial court of the United States held within 
the district in which such association may be 
established, or in any state, county, or municipal 
court in the county, or municipal court in the 
county or city in which said association is located 
having jurisdiction in similar cases." 
The Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §78aa) provides: 
"The district courts of the United States, and the 
United States courts of any territory or other 
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States - shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
violations of this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity 
and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or du~y created by this chapter or -the 
rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal 
proceeding may be brought in the district 
wherein any act or transaction constituting the 
violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce 
any liability 'or duty created by this chapter or 
rules and regula_tions thereunder, or to enjoin any 
violation of such chapter or rules and 
regulations, may be brought in any such district 
or in the district wherein the defendant is found 
or is an inhabitant or transacts business; and 
. process in such cases may be served in any other 
district of which the defendant IS an 
inhabitant .... " 
196 U.S. 375, 398, 25 S.Ct. 276, 280, 49 
L.Ed. 518 (1905) that "commerce among 
the states is not a technical legal concep-
tion, but a practical one, drawn for the 
course of business," and of the broad 
interpretation given the statute in other 
circuits. Sterling v. United States, 333 
F.2d 443 (9 Cir. 1964); United States v. 
Berger, 338 F.2d 485, 487 (2 Cir. 1964); 
United States v. D'Antonio, 342 F.2d 667 
(7 Cir. 1965). In our view it does not 
unduly stretch the concept of a con-
tinuing, though interrupted, shipment in 
commerce to apply it here, where sugar, 
purchased in Puerto Rico, was shipped to 
Baltimore and held temporarily in a 
warehouse pending final delivery to buy-
ers in other states in fulfillment of or-
ders previously given. There is no ab-
solute requirement that the flow of com-
merce be continuous if there is the clear 
intention to resume the journey after a 
brief pause. The District Judge's find-
ings are not clearly erroneous and the 
judgment is 
Affirmed. 
BRUNS, NORDEMAN & CO., a Limited 
Partnership, Plaintiff·Appellant, 
v. 




The Exchange Corp., Maurice Benjamin 
and Edward H. Levitt, Defendants. 
No. 344, Docket 31987. 
United States Court of Appeals 
Second Circuit. 
Argued March 20, 1968. 
Decided April 19, 1968. 
Action by New York broker-dealer 
against national bank and trust company 
"established" in Chicago, Florida cor-
poration, Florida corporation's presi-
dent-principal owner, and Louisianian 
for alleged conspiracy to sell, in violation 
of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 10,000 shares of 
unregistered corporate stock owned . by 
Louisianian and pledged to bank and 
trust company. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District 
of New York, Sylvester J. Ryan, J., 284 
F.Supp. 387, entered judgment dismiss-
ing, for lack of venue, so much of com-
plaint as related to the bank and trust 
company, and broker-dealer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Friendly, Circuit 
Judge, held that venue was improperly 
laid in the Southern District of New 
York as to the bank and trust company. 
Affirmed. 
1. Courts €:=:>274(6) 
Special and properly wide venue 
provisions of Securities Act of 1933 and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not 
overcome special and exceedingly nar-
row venue provisions of National Bank 
Act of 1864. Securities Act of 1933, 
§ 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq.; 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1 
et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.; Na-
tional Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 94. 
2. Courts ~214(6) 
In action by New York broker-
dealer against national bank and trust 
company "established" in Chicago, Flor-
ida corporation, Florida corporation's 
president-principal owner, and Louisian· 
ian for alleged conspiracy to sell, in 
violation of Securities Act of 1933 and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 10,000 
shares of unregistered corporate stock 
owned by Louisianian and pledged to 
national bank and trust company, venue 
was improperly laid in Southern District 
of New York as to national bank and 
trust company. National Bank Act, 12 
U.S.C.A. § 94 ; Securities Act of 1933, 
§§ 1 et seq., 3(a) (2), 5, 12(1, 2), 17(a), 
22(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq., 77c(a) 
(2), 77e, 77l(1, 2), 77q(a), 77v; Securi· 
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1 et seq .. 
BRUNS, NORDEMAN & CO. v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. 301 
Cite as 3~ F .2d 300 (1968) 
10, 27, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq., 78j, 
78aa; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391(a, b), 1404 
(a). 
3. Courts <t=:>277.1 
Where, to bring action against na-
tional bank and trust company "estab-
lished" in Chicago and others for viola-
tion of Securities Act of 1933 and Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 in sale 
of unregistered corporate stock, plaintiff 
would have to resort to Illinois to sue 
national bank and trust company, any 
action brought in Illinois could not be 
transferred to Southern District of New 
York for convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, since action could not have been 
brought in that district. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
140-1 (a); Securities Act of 1933, § 1 et 
seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq. ; Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 1 et seq., 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. 
4. Courts <t=:>268 
Where Congress has dealt with a 
particular venue problem, broader lan-
guage in general venue statute will not 
overcome this even though literally ap-
plicable. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a, b). 
Spencer Pinkham, New York City 
(Colton & Pinkham and David J. Colton, 
New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-
appellant. 
John R. Hupper, New York City 
(Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Edwin 
A. Kilburn, New York City, of counsel), 
for defendant-appellee. 
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, 
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge, and BLU-
MENFELD, District Judge.* 
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge : 
[1] A federal court of appeals is here 
confronted for the first time with an 
issue 'that has provoked a difference of 
opinion among district courts : Do the 
special and properly wide venue provi-
• Of_ the Dis trict Court of Connecticut, sit-
tm~ by ucsignu tion. 
1• The statutory history is recounted in 
Mercantile Nut'! Bunk v. Lnngdcnu, 371 
sions of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
overcome the special and exceedingly 
narrow venue provis ions1 of the Nation-
al Bank Act of 1864? Judge Ryan, in 
the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, here followed the 
opinion of Judge Tenney of that district 
that they do not, General Electric Credit 
Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., and Frank-
lin National Bank, 271 F.Supp. 699 
(1966), a view also adopted, as an alter-
native ground of decision, by Judge 
Horowitz in the Northern District of 
Illinois, Berman v. Thomson and The 
First National Bank of Boston et a!. , 
284 F.Supp. 521. The opposite position 
was taken by Judge Coolahan of the 
District of New Jersey in Levin v. Great 
Western Sugar Company and Colorado 
National Bank of Denver, et a!., 274 
F.Supp. 974. We conclude with regret 
that the rulings upholding the claim of 
prevalence of the 1864 statute are right. 
[2, 3] The complaint, summarily 
stated, alleged a conspiracy among four 
defendants to effectuate, in violation of 
§§ 5, 12(1) and 17(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and § 10(b) of the 1934 
Act, the sale of 10,000 shares of unreg-
istered common stock of Canaveral Cor-
poration, owned by defendant Levitt, 
apparently a Louisianian, and pledged 
by him to the defendant, American Na-
tional Bank and '!"rust Company, "estab-
lished" in Chicago. The conspiracy was 
to be accomplished as follows : Levitt 
was to sell the shares to Benjamin, pres-
ident and principal owner of The Ex-
change Corporation, a Florida corpora-
tion, which was to pay Levitt out of 
the proceeds of a resale. Exchange was 
a customer of plaintiff, a New York 
broker-dealer. Pursuant to Exchange's 
instructions plaintiff sold the 10,000 
shares in New York and sent the bank 
its draft for $65,000. The bank received 
this and forwarded to New York certif-
U.S. 555, 558-561, 83 S.Ct. 520, 9 L.Eu. 
2d 5!!3 (1963). 
I 
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icates for the shares, although knowing 
they were not registered and could not 
be sold without violating § 5 of the 1933 
Act. The transfer agent for Canaveral 
refused to accept the certificates for 
transfer and plaintiff had to cover in 
a rising market, thereby sustaining a 
total loss (including the $65,000 pay-
ment) of $73,353.43. On motion of the 
Chicago National Bank Judge Ryan dis-
missed the complaint against it and en-
tered the language appropriate for mak-
ing the judgment final under F.R.Civ. 
P. 54(a). 
Section 94 of the National Bank Act, 
originally adopted in 1864, 13 Stat. 99, 
116, provides, so far as pertinent, that 
suits against a national bank 
"may be had in any district or ter-
ritorial court of the United States held 
within the district in which such as-
sociation may be established, or in any 
State, county or municipal court in 
the county or city in which the asso-
ciation is located." 
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933 provides that any suit or action to 
enforce any liability or duty created by 
the Act 
"may be brought in the district where-
in the defendant is found or is an 
inhabitant or transacts business, or in 
the district where the offer or sale 
took place, if the defendant partici-
pated therein, and process in such 
cases may be served in any other dis-
trict of which the defendant is an 
inhabitant, or wherever the defendant 
may be found." 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 contains a provision with 
like or, indeed, even broader effect. 
The contention that the provisions of 
the securities legislation should be read 
as overcoming the historic venue limita-
tion whereby national banks can be sued 
2. The situation would be different under § 
27 of the 1934 Act which gives venue "in 
the district wherein any act or trans-
action constituting the violation occurred." 
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities 
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 204-205 (5 Cir. 
only where "established" or "located" 
has 
1 
much I~ractical appeal. Plaintiff 
points out that actions ; herein banks 
are sued for violation of the securities 
laws are typically multi-defendant ac-
tions, as illustrated by this case and 
the three others cited. Recognition of 
the probable multi-defendant character 
of securities suits was doubtless an im-
portant reason for the liberal venue pro-
visions of § 22(a) of the 1933 Act and 
§ 27 of the 1934 Act, in contrast to the 
restrictive requirement of the general 
venue statute, § 51 of the Judicial Code 
of 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1101, whereby 
federal question actions could be brought 
only in the district of which the defend-
ant was an inhabitant. See also § 50. 
If appellee had been an Illinois state 
bank or trust company, plaintiff could 
have joined it in this action since the 
sale took place in New York. Of all 
the fagots in plaintiff's bundle, the na-
tional character of appellee's incorpora-
tion is surely the least important. Com-
pare Liberty Nat!. Bank & T. Co. v. 
Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 288 N.Y.S.2d 
33, 235 N.E.2d 101 (1968); First Ag-
ricultural National Bank v. State Tax 
Comm., 229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass.Sup.J.Ct. 
1967), appeal docketed, 389 U.S. 1033, 
88 S.Ct. 774, 19 L.Ed.2d 819. Yet under 
the view upheld by the district judge, 
the plaintiff must resort to Illinois to 
sue · appellee; it is exceedingly doubtful 
whether the 1933 Act would allow him 
to sue the other defendants there since 
the unlawful "offer or sale" apparently 
occurred in New York; 2 and the Illinois 
action could not be transferred to the 
Southern District of New York under 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) since it could not 
"have been brought" in that district. 
The result thus is heavy inconvenience 
for the plaintiff and a burden for the 
federal courts, as against the burden on 
appellee- slight in this age of cheap long 
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S.Ct. 
695, 5 L.Ed.2d 693 (1961). However, 
although the complaint sets forth a claim 
under § 10 of the 1934 Act, this might 
well be subject to motion. 
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Cite as 394 F.2d 300 (1008) 
distance telephone rates, efficient meth-
ods for copying documents and jet air 
transport-of defending an action in 
New York rather than Chicago. While 
I 
some of these factors also ease the bur-
den of plaintiff in suing in Chicago, there 
remains the serious difficulty in proceed-
ing there against the other defendants. 
I 
If we were writing on a clean slate, 
we would not find it difficult to reconcile 
§ 94 of the N a tiona] Bank Act with § 
22(a) of the Securities Act. Since § 94 
reads in terms of permission rather than 
prohibition, it would not be a great feat 
of construction to read this as fixing 
venue only when an apJ?licable venue 
statute placed this on the basis of being 
a "resident" or "inhabitant," and not 
as proscribing other places of suit when 
the venue statute permitted this where 
' 
an act was done. s~ch apparently was 
the view of Mr. Justice Black, joined 
'Jy Mr. Justice Douglas, in Michigan 
y .Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591, 
I 5~4-595, 83 S.Ct. 914, 9 L.Ed.2d 961 
~1963). But, equally apparently, this 
~ was not the view taken by the majoncy 
in fliat ca~e ana In fhe Sl lgh£ly earlier 
one of i\1' e~antile Nat'! Bank v. Lang-
deau, 37iuJt"~'""8S S.Ct.=t"2o, 9 i::E d. 
2ct"523 (1963). True those decisions con-
cerned the portion of § 94, added in 1864, 
13 Stat. 99, permitting suits in certain 
state courts and not the portion, stem-
ming from § 59 of the Act of 1863, 12 
Stat. 665, providing that suits "may be 
had in any district or Territorial court 
of the United States held within the 
district in which such association may 
be established," and on the one occasion 
when the issue seems to have been 
squarely presented to the Supreme 
Court, it placed its decision in favor 
of the bank 0n lack of jurisdiction, and 
said it had "no occasion to consider" 
the issue of venue. Bank of America 
v. Whitney Central Nat'! Bank, 261 U.S. 
171, 173, 43 S.Ct. 311, 67 L.Ed. 594 
~ (1923). However, this COJU:t has given 
'i construction to the clause of § 94 deal-
ing with the venue of suits in a federal 1 
court quite as Draconian as the Supreme 
Court lias done with respect to the state 
court clause, Leonardi v. Chase Nat'! 
Bank, 2 Cir., 81 F.2d 19, cert. denied, 
298 U.S. 677, 56 S.Ct. 941, 80 L.Ed. 
1398 (1936), the Seventh Circuit has 
followed us, Buffum v. Chase Nat'! 
Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (1951), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 944, 72 S.Ct. 558, 96 L.Ed. 
702 (1952), and it would indeed strain 
language to say tb.gt t he same verbs 
were merely permissive wit ti re ec o 
1 s er I courts although roh 'b-
itory as to actions in state ones. . 
[ 4] The Supreme Court has emphat-
ically held that where Congress has dealt 
with a particular venue problem-here 
actions against national banks- broader 
language in a general venue statute will 
not overcome this even though literally 
applicable. Stonite Products Co. v. 
Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 
780, 86 L.Ed. 1026 (1942); Fourco Glass 
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 
U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 
(1957). Indeed, appellant apparently 
concedes that the present general venue 
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b), 
would not overcome § 94 of the N a tiona! 
Bank Act even if it did not contain the 
words "except as otherwise provided by 
law." 3 Its contention is rather that the J 
venue clauses of the two securities acts 
are themselves "special" venue statutes, 
and that in such a case the latter pre-
vails. We think it inappropriate to re-
solve the issue so mechanically. The 
question rather is whether, given the 
seventy years of highly restricted venue 
of actions against national banks, there 
is sufficient reason to think that the 
Congresses which enacted the 1933 and 
1934 securities legislation intended to 
carve out an exception for claims under 
the securities laws. 
J'!qjhing i~islative history of 
the venue provisions of the 1933 and 
1934 Acts indicates that Congress had 
given thought to Uie s a us o na JOn-
3. These words in the 19-lS revision supplanteu narrower language in § 51 of the 1911 Colle, 
3(i Stat. 1087, 1101. 
I 
a! banks. This is not surprising. Na-
tional banks, under extensive supervi-
sion by the Comptroller of the Curren-
l cy, were hardly envisioned as likely dES,fendants in actions under £Fie new se-curities laws. In fact, the House Com-mittee Report reveals that Congress ex- ' 
pressly relied on the Comptroller when, 
in the 1933 Act, it exempted securities 
of national banks from the requirement 
of registration, § 3(a) (2),4 and, even 
more significantly, from civil liability 
for fraud in their distribution. § 12(2). 
H.Rep.No.85, 73 Cong., 1st Sess. 14 
(1933). Such prospects as that a na-
tional bank as pledgee might knowingly 
participate in the attempted sale of an 
unregistered security, as here alleged, or 
that by acting as an intermediary in an 
exchange offer a national bank might 
join in a violation of § 10 (b) of the 
1934 Act were hardly in Congress' mind. 
Moreover, if the problem had occurred 
to Congress, we cannot be at all certain 
how that body would have wished it 
resolved; the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency now stoutly opposes the broad 
venue rule which the SEC advocates, see 
General Electric Credit Corp. v. James 
Talcott, Inc., supra, 271 F.Supp. at 701. 
Concededly the case is not one where 
adherence to § 94 of the National Bank 
Act prevents a suit against such a bank 
for violation of the securities legislation 
from being brought anywhere-a situa-
tion that led to the carving out of an 
exception to § 94 for "local actions." 
See Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 26 
L.Ed. 52 (1880). Here suit against the 
bank in Chicago is not impossible but 
simply inconvenient. Appellant's case 
thus does not measure up to the stand-
ards laid down in United States v. Bor-
den & Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-199, 60 
S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939), see also 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 
373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 
4. It was only in 1955 that the Commission, 
reversing more than 20 years of con-
trary practice, limiteu § 3(n) (2) ex-
cmtJtions to issues of the bnnk's own se-
curities anu helrl that American De-
pository Receipts against outstanding for-
eign securities issued by a bank mu~t be 
L.Ed.2d 389 (1963), to justify a holding 
of repeal-even partial repeal-by im-
plication. Granted that the situation 
calls for remedy, this lies in Congress, 
whether by specification in the venue 
sections of the sec·1rities Jaws, by a more 
general overhaul of § 94 of the National 
Banking Act, see Mercantile Nat'! Bank 
v. Langdeau, supra, 371 U.S. at 563, 
83 S.Ct. 520, or both. 
Affirmed. 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plain tiff· A ppel!ec, 
v. 
Salvatore BATTAGLIA and Dave Evans, 
Defendants· Appellants. 
Nos. 16312, 16313. 
Un.ited States Court of Appeals 
Seventh Circuit. 
Jan. 9, 1968. 
Defendants were convicted of con-
spiring against builder of apartments to 
violate Hobbs Act proscribing interfer-
ence with commerce by extortion. The 
United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Di-
vision, Julius J. Hoffman, J., rendered 
judgments, and the defendants appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Cummings, Circuit 
Judge, held, among other things, that the 
evidence sustained the conviction, that it 
was not error to deny bill of particulars, 
that the conspiracy instruction was 
proper, that admission of pre-indictment 
threats was proper, that cross-examina-
registered. 22 SEC Ann.Rep. 43 (1956). 
While this decision was undoubtedly sound 
on policy grounds, see 1 Loss, Securities 
Regulation 564-65 (1961), a review of the 
lcgislntivc history indicateu that Con-
gress did not specifically consider this 
problem, sec Loss, supra, at 564 n. 18. 
75-268 RADZANOWER v. fmJ~~~~& CO. cJte (. ~~ed 3/30/76 
kd 13~t.- ~ ~· . -
:h-.-d- ~J. IU-- '1 ~1--nv t~/ C/Ue_. ~ 
-- ~-;;, I' 
~---~~~ .L1 ~ .1 ~ a~ d<.l-{.~ 
~-§ I ('J {?) ~<-:1- ~fL-t...; ' "3 'f Ci4 , }Y C d~ 
,q_;?, ~ ~~ ~ ~ (.)-(?~.u_d, , c:  n- 2.. ~~ 
~J 1~ '7' /J/~A£c:U-t- o/ IY~ <? ~ 
~~- r_~ ~ ~ ~ . (~~~ 1--o ~~~ 
~ ~~~L.~~~7~~.'\ 
5 1-7 t7 ~'I~ /~~~ ~~-Ry 1-o ~_z_ 
4~~-<:, /  e(_, L\ ~ -k ~ 
~ '-L-/ ..1-,.,~__,~__,J-.. ~ ~;$" 
()~ ------ . 
• 
~1-rvJ~ , ~ af .,~~~ ~ 
-<'~~LJ ~ ~-~1-
'E-~J.v. ~__.,__. ~. ~ /.Lij1.,J;;:p4-t:..J ~ 
~JZc'., q ~~? - -R-?G~.J':_ £eVa ~P~ 7'f'~1; 
&~..:/- J..~ctJ~~~?7t U.S.s-:'s-~1~~ 
k ~& ailiJ'~ Uti!.&~,~ -t--t- --~ 
~4 u,J~cf7~~ ( ~J~. ~~~~ 
t-~~+ ~ Ald6k v~~ {IJA--
~ /M:ij;:( ~~ -v.H-~ ~ ~ 
~~1) 
&£... rt-e"'~~ ~r~J-~<:t ~~~~ ~­
ALR"r ~. Lu w-1~ v~---~1 ~ ~, 
~(lU-4--j 
~~~Y~:s ad~ 
~~~_];(_ ~ ~~, <SoY cL ;£ 
J)~ - A (' ) 
~ ,, ~?J 5_s c~- :s (f ~* 
1~~~ ~ h-v ~· .h:J. 
H~~-e/7-J r'~L ~ ~~ 
~~ ~1-o #4. ~ ~ l_;f 
~'7~1-4L ~ ~ ~ s 'f~ ~ 
TVJ-t:) ~~ ~~~-~~- ,. 
j- s~~ /U-t!J.~ U£4 ~ ~ 
~~ ~ ~~f-tr£, ~1'-1) ~ 
~~Vo .s~~~-~~~~ 
~ ~5' ~~ ~ 1--tu;.::;;{ ~ L ~ ~ 
of ~42-,_-~-:L-4"---- ~ , -7 c:;L ~ ~~ 
~ --e~ --~.-......c.A..~~-<-A 
H q • n ./,... 
w~-v' ~~ ~· ~-R~ H) 
~ £---~ --: ( 1/ ~~ac.1 ~~__.~) 
~ ;>< y 
~U~5G~ a)' c;JI' 
~~ ~~ fiu_ /-<_.._l_.{) ~~J-4! ~ 
'-~q-~~~~, ~~~.i SGc ;-t~ 
L---t--1 -~~- ~fl~ ~ J;{<£1 
f-{,_._ ~ad~~0G-f~J.J 
g ?0~-:-- ( ~) 
' &_..~1F &~._t_; ~ ~~ to d~ 
&.- _.17~~ ~~~~ ,J'~~~u~ L-L~ ?{_/ ·Cf 
715 l?e4-v ~ 1..-<--'-./ !)_ c u_,_;:f- u~ ~~~ 
~ ~~~-/ ,,~ -f'eJtf, &~ ~~d-<?~~ 
~~ ~c ~ 2/t~ ~ --F-ll~ ~ 
~-
 to c /l 2..- t--Uzt-v ~ ~ ~ 
~~. -~~~~~ 
~ ~~ ~.pd/ ~~~J.. ~ 
c,Lf?- ~~ ~~~-£'-<-7~ 
~~ f/{'UL- '74'--fu'~·  . 
! . i-f-t{;?t.J ~tA I¥-- 1' d~ ~t?~ H~ 
~u_ vv- ~ ~4- /.-.<-~ c A- :2- ~J.... ~~ 
~ P-z-~ Vl.A- c ,4 2- i-z__) ~.P J I 
~:;t:f£& ii&?cc>v' Ptu£f ,{Z.·,.-
1{e;,{tit3 #t;~ - X )( '{ 
~~~ 
--L---- ,) .f-t-<_ 








.To: The ;L.ri. 
Mr. Ju.,t.ice Brennan 
Mr. Just i ce White 
Mr. Just' ce Marshall 
?!r. Ju .. )~ ·,... l 3lackmun 
~-fr. JuL d l 
Mr . • Tu 1-J.Uist 
Mr. JUJv , 'v Jll S 
From : Hr . .; .... ..., ,, •nart 
c •rculat.:Jd: 
MAY 14 197~ 
Recir cu..!.·.L 
1st DRAFr 





Touche, Ross & Co. et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Cir-
cuit. 
[May -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
This case requires us to determine which venue pro-
vision controls in the event a national bank~cia­
tion is sued in a federal court for allegedly violating the 
Securities Exchange Act: the broad venue provision of 
the Securities Exchange Act, which allows suits under 
that Act to be brought in any district where the defend-
ant may be found , or the narrow venue provision of the 
National Bank Act, which allows national banking asso-
ciations to be sued only in the district where they are 
established. 
The petitioner, Hyman Radzanower, instituted a class 
action in the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York alleging, inter alia, that the respondent, First 
National Bank of Boston, a national banking association 
with its principal office in Boston, Mass., had violated 
the federal securities laws by failing to disclose to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing 
public its knowledge of certain adverse financial infor-
mation about one of its customers, the TelePrompter 
Corporation , and of securities laws violations by that 
company. The complaint alleged that venue was proper 
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under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78aa, which provides that "[a] ny suit or action to 
enforce any liability or duty created [by or under the 
Securities Exchange Act] ... may be brought in any such 
district [wherein any act or transaction constituting the 
violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defend-
ant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts busi-
ness .... " The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint 
as to it, asserting that venue as to it lay only under § 94 
of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. § 94. That section 
provides that "[a]ctions and proceedings against any 
[national banking] association under this chapter may be 
had in any district or Territorial court of the United 
States held within the district in which such association 
may be established .... " 1 
Following the settled law of the Second Circuit, the 
District Court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss. It 
held that "[a]bsent waiver or consent, a national bank 
may be sued only in the district in which it is established. 
12 U. S. C. Section 94." The Court noted that the 
Bank was established in Boston "because its charter 
specifies Boston as its principal place of business," 2 and 
it rejected the petitioner's claim that the Bank had 
1 Section 94 in its entirety reads: 
1'Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter 
may be had in any district or territorial court of the United Sta.tes 
held within the district in which such association may be established, 
or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in 
which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases." 
2 The petitioner does not claim that. the Bank is "established" 
anywhere else than in Boston. Federal courts have consistently 
ruled that the place specified in a bank's charter as its home office 
is determinative of the district in which the bank is "established" 
for purposes of § 94. See, e. g., Buffum v. Chase Nat. Bank, 192 
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waived the provisions of § 94.3 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed without opinion.4 Because of differing views 
in the Circuits as to the statutory venue question pre-
sented,5 we granted the petition for certiorari. - U. S. 
Section 94 provides that suits against a national bank-
ing association "may be had" in the federal district court 
for the district where such association is established. 
The Court has held that this grant of venue is manda-
tory and exclusive: "The phrase 'suits ... may be had' 
was, in every respect, appropriate language for the pur-
pose of specifying the precise courts in which Congress 
consented to have national banks subject to suit and we 
believe Congress intended that in those courts alone 
could a national bank be sued against its will." Mer-
cantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 560. Ac-
3 The opinion of the District Court is unreported. 
It has long been settled that the restrictive venue provisions of 
§ 94 can be waived by a defendant bank. See, e. g., Charlotte Nat. 
Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145; Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robert-
son, 372 U. S. 591, 594; NationaL Bank of North America v. Associ-
ates of Obstetrics & FemaLe Surgery,- U.S.-. 
Although the parties each devcoted a portion of their briefs to 
the waiver issue, that issue was not raised in the petition for 
certiorari. Since we consider "[o]nJy the questions set forth in the 
petition or fairly comprised therein," Sup. Ct. Rule 23.1 (c), we 
have no occasion to pass on the correctness of the decisions below 
on the waiver question. 
4 The judgment of the Cou,rt of Appeals is reported, at 516 F. 2d 
896. 
5 The Second and Ninth Circuits have concluded that § 94 is the 
exclusive venue provision governing suits against national banking 
associations, while the Third Circuit has ruled that such suits may 
also be brought pursuant to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Compare Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat. Bank & 
Trust Co., 394 F. 2d 300 (CA2), and United States Nat. Bank v. 
Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (CA9), with Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktien~ 
gesellschajt, 483 F. 2d &52 (CA3) . 
' ' 
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cord, Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591; 
National Bank of North America v. Associates of ob-
stetrics & Female Surgery, - U. S. -.6 The venue 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act, by contrast, al-
lows suits under that Act to be brought anywhere that 
the Act is violated or a defendant does business or can 
otherwise be found. It is the petitioner's contention 
that when a national bank is named as a defendant in a 
suit brought under the Securities Exchange Act, it loses 
the protection of the venue provisions of § 94 and may 
be sued in any federal judicial district where that Act 
was violated or where it does business or can be found. 
For the reasons that follow, we cannot accept that 
contention. 
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a 
statute dealing with a narrow, precise and specific sub-
ject is not submerged by a later-enacted statute covering 
a more generalized spectrum. "Where there is no clear 
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be con-
trolled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the 
priority of enactment." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 
535, 550-551.7 "The reason and philosophy of the rule 
6 When the Langdeau Court held that the words "may be had" 
serve to provide mandatory and exclusive venue, it was dealing 
with thE' rE'lationship of § 94 to a state venue statute. Since the 
same words arE' used m connection with the federal-court venue 
provision, the same ron~truct10n is virtually inescapable. "[I]t 
would indred stmin language to say that the same verbs were 
mE'rE'ly prrmissive with rrsprct to suits in federal courts although 
prohibitory as to actions in ~tatr ones." Bruns, Nordemann & Co. 
v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., :394 F. 2d 300, 303 (CA2). 
7 Ser Brown v. General Services Administration, - U. S. -; 
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758; Rodgers v. 
United States, 185 U. S. !:l3, 87-89 ("It is a canon of statutory con-
st ructiOn that a latE'r statutr, general in its terms and not ex-
prpssly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affecL 
the ~perial provi;;ion~ of such rarlicr statute." !d., at R7); Ex 
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is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned 
to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a 
subsequent statute in general terms, or treating the sub-
ject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting 
the original act, shall not be considered as intended to 
affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, 
unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act 
such a construction, in order that its words shall have 
any meaning at all." T. Sedgwick, Interpretation and 
Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 
(2d ed. 1874).8 
When Congress enacted the narrow venue provisions 
of the National Bank Act, it was focusing on the particu-
larized problems of national banks that might be sued 
in the state or federal courts. When, 70 years later, 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, its focus 
was on the objective of promoting fair dealing in the 
securities markets, and it enacted a general venue pro-
vision applicable to the broad universe of potential de-
fC'ndants subject to the prohibitions of that Act. Thus, 
unless a "clear intention otherwise" can be discerned, 
the principle of statutory construction discussed above 
counsels that the specific venue provisions of § 94 are 
applicable to the respondent in this case. Fourco Glasg 
Co. v. Transmirra Products Co., 353 U. S. 222. 
The issue thus boils down to whether a "clear inten-
tion otherwise" can be discovered-whether, in short, it 
can be fairly concluded that the venue provision of the 
Securities Exchange Act operated as a pro tanto repeal 
parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 570-571. See also Fourco Glass Co. 
v. 'l'ransmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222; Stonite Products Co. 
v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561 (specific venue statutes for 
patent suits prevml ovrr grneral venue statutes). 
8 See also lA J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Constmctiun 
§23.15 (4th eel C. Sand~ 1972), . 
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of § 94. "It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statu-
tory construction that repeals by implication are not fa-
vored." United States v. United Continental Tuna 
Corp., - U S. -, -.9 There are, however, 
"two well-settled categories of repeals by implica-
tion-( 1) where provisions in the two acts are in 
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of 
the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the 
earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the 
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly in-
tended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a 
repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the 
intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear 
and manifest .... " Posadas v. National City Bank, 
296 U. S. 497, 503. 
It is evident that the "two acts" in this case fall into 
neither of those categories. 
The statutory provisions at issue here cannot be said 
to be in "irreconcilable conflict" in the sense that there 
is a positive repugnancy between them or that they 
cannot mutually coexist. It is not enough to show that 
the two statutes produce differing results when applied 
to the same factual situation, for that no more than 
states the problem. Rather, "when two statutes are 
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts ... 
to regard each as effective." Morton v. M ancari, supra, 
at 551. As the Court put the matter in discussing the 
interrelationship of the antitrust laws and the securities 
laws, " [ r] epeal is to be regarded as implied only if neces-
sary to make the [later enacted law] work, and even 
then only to the minimum extent necessary. This is 
0 See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U. S. 659, 
GS2; Regional Rml Reorgamzation Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 133; 
Silver v. New York Stork Exrhange, 37:3 U. S. 341, 357; United 
States v Borden Co., ~08 U S. 188, 198-199 
' 0 
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the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statu-
tory schemes." Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 
U. S. 341, 357.' 0 
Here the basic purposes of the Securities Exchange 
Act can be fairly served by giving full effect to the pro-
visions of § 94. The primary purpose of the Securities 
Exchange Act was not to regulate the activities of na-
tional banks as such but " [ t] o provide fair and honest 
mechanisms for the pricing of securities [and] to assure 
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue pref-
erences or advantages among investors .... " H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-229, p. 91.' 1 Its venue provision, § 27, 
was intended to facilitate that goal by enabling suits 
to enforce rights created by the Act to be brought wher-
ever a defendant could be found. The venue provision 
of the National Bank Act, § 94, was intended, on the 
other hand, "'for the convenience of those [banking} 
institutions, and to prevent interruption in their busi-
ness that might result from their books being sent to 
distant counties .... '" Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 
132 U. S. 141, 145, quoted in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. 
Langdcau, 371 U. S. 555, 561-562, n. 12. 
By allowing suits against national banks to be brought 
only pursuant to ~ 94, the purposes of that section will 
obviously be served. Yet application of § 94 will not 
10 See also Gordon v. New York Stofk Exchange, 422 U.S . 659, 
685; United States"· National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 42Z U.S. 
694, 1.34-735. 
11 The legislativE> history of the securities acts does not indi'cate· 
that Congress considered banks as likely defendants in actions· 
brought under those acts. While Congress did examine problems 
stemming from the relationship of banks and the securities business· 
in the early 1930s, see S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Se::;s .. it 
dealt with those problems in comprehensive legislation d·ealing only 
with banks. Ser Banking Act of 19:33, 48 Stat. 162. See generall~­
lnvestm.ent Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617. 
' . 
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"unduly interfere" with the operation of the Securities 
Exchange Act. See Gordon v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 422 U. S. 659, 686. Section 94 will have no 
impact whatever upon the vast majority of lawsuits 
brought under that Act. In the tiny fraction of litiga-
tion where its effect will be felt, it will foreclose nobody 
from invoking the Act's provisions. Members of the 
investing public will still be free to bring actions against 
national banks under the Act. While suits against this 
narrow and infrequent category of defendants will have 
to be brought where the defendant is established, that is 
hardly an insurmountable burden in this day of easy and 
rapid transportation.12 Since it is possible for the stat-
utes to coexist in this manner, they are not so repugnant 
to each other as to justify a finding of an implied repeal 
by this Court. It is simply not "necessary" that § 94 
be repealed in part in order "to make the Securities Ex-
change Act work." See Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change, supra, at 357. 
Moreover, it cannot be said either that "the later act 
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly 
intended as a substitute," or that "the intention of the 
legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest." The Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 covers a "subject" quite 
different from the National Bank Act. The 1934 Act 
was enacted primarily to halt securities fraud, not to· 
regulate banks. Indeed, banks were specifically ex-
12 The SEC suggests that its enforcement activity under the Se-
curities Exchange Act will be hindered in cases of securities law 
violations by geographically dispersed banks, if it cannot sue all 
defendant/:!, including the banks, in one proceeding. The SEC,. 
however, was unable to cite a 8ingle instance in the last 40 years 
where thii:l si tuation has arisen. In any event, policy arguments 
such as this are more appropriately addresl:!ed to Congress than to. 
thii:! Court. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, supra, at 563.. 
' 0 
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empted from many provisions of the securities laws/3 
and Congress almost contemporaneously enacted other 
specific legislation dealing with the problems arising 
from banks' involvement in the securities business.14 
The passage of that legislation and the exemption of 
national banks from important provisions of the securi-
ties laws suggest, if anything, that Congress was reaffirm-
ing its view that national banks should be regulated sep-
arately by specific legislation applying only to them.1 ~ 
And there is nothing in the legislative history of the 
Securities Exchange Act to support the view that Con-
gress in enacting it gave the slightest consideration to 
the pro tanto repeal of § 94, let alone to indicate "that 
Congress consciously abandoned its [prior] policy" M or-
ton v. Mancari, supra, at 551, or that its intent to repeal 
§94 pro tanto was "'clear and manifest,'" United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198, quoting Red 
Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602.16 
13 See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77c (a) (2), 771 (2); cf. 15 U. S. C. § 78c 
(a) (6). 
14 Seen. 11, supra. 
15 This intention was expressly stated by Congress when it ex-
empted bank securities from the registration statements require-
ments of the Securities Act of 1933: " [A] dequate supervision over 
the issuance of securities of a national bank is exercised by the 
Comptroller of the Currency." H . R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 14. Subsequent Congresses have continued to follow this 
policy. For example, while national banks are subject to the 
registration, reporting, and proxy requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act , in 1964 Congress amended the Act so that the ad-
ministration of those parts of the Act with respect to banks was 
transferred from the SEC to the various federal banking authori-
ties. See Pub L. No. 88-467, § 3 (e), 78 Stat. 568, codified at 15 
U.S. C.§ 781 (i). 
16 In 1959 Congress reviewed the National Bank Act and adopted 
an act designed "to repeal certain [national banking] laws which 
have become obsolete." See Pub. L. No. 86-230, 73 Stat. 457. 
When it did so, it did not repeal § 94. 
' . 
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For these reasons it is impossible to conclude that § 94 
was partially repealed by implication in 1934. It fol-
lows under the general principles of statutory construc-
tion discussed above that the narrowly drawn, specific 
venue provision of the National Bank Act must prevail 
over the broader, more generally applicable venue pro-
vision of the Securities Exchange Act. We conclude, 
therefore, that a national banking association is subject 
to suit under the Securities Exchange Act only in that 
district wherein it is established, and that the judgment 
before us must accordingly be affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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